Risk analysis methodology survey by Batson, Robert G.
WN 8- 15604.
• "_.J
1987
NASA/ASEE SUMMER FACULTY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE
RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY SURVEY
Prepared by:
Academic Rank:
University and Department:
Robert G. Batson, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
The University of Alabama
Department of Industrial Engineering
NASA/MSFC:
Directorate:
Office:
Group:
MSFC Colleagues:
Date:
Contract No:
Program Development
Program Planning
Engineering Cost Group
Joseph W. Hamaker
W. A. Ferguson
July 3, 1987
The University of Alabama
in Huntsville
NGT-01-008-021
III
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19880006222 2020-03-20T07:38:41+00:00Z
ABSTRACT
Several NASA regulations specify that formal risk analysis be
performed on a program at each of several milestones as it moves toward
full-scale development. Program risk analysis is discussed as a systems
analysis approach to risk, an iterative process (identification, assess-
ment, management), and a collection of techniques. These techniques,
which range from extremely simple to complex, network-based simulation,
were surveyed. A Program Risk Analysis Handbook was prepared in order
to provide both analyst and manager with a guide for selection of the
most appropriate technique.
Various researchers have verified that 85-90% of the risk in
complex, technological systems development originates in the technical
definition of the system• Risk may be assessed on cost, schedule, or
performance individually; the preferred approach is to treat these as
dependent random variables and perform an integrated risk assessment.
All program risk assessment techniques were shown to be based on elici-
tation and encoding of subjective probability estimates from the various
area experts on a program• Techniques to encode the five most common
distribution-types were given. Then, a total of twelve distinct ap-
proaches to risk assessment were given• For each approach we identified
the steps involved, good and bad points, time involved, and degree of
computer support needed.
We discuss why risk analysis should be used by all NASA program
managers. How to establish a risk analysis capability and some of the
special difficulties in performing a risk analysis were related. Tools
available at NASA/MSFC were identified, along with commercially
available software. Both an extensive bibliography (150 entries) and a
program risk analysis check-list were provided.
Recommendations are to:
l • Perform integrated cost/risk assessment on each program, prior to
each RFP release•
. Require contractors to perform quantitative risk assessments during
proposal preparation and after contract award•
. Select (or hire) a full-time risk analyst in Program Planning, with
responsibilities for applications, methods development, interface
with other centers, and consulting to program and engineering
managers.
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INTRODUCTION
The article "GRO Project Beset by Complications" appeared in the
6/14/87 Huntsville Times. The NASA/GSFC Project Manager, Jeremiah
Madden, stated "the sheer magnitude and complexity of the GRO program
overwhelmed managers and engineers and obscured some of the program's
finer details." These complications occur on all space and defense
projects, especially those that use unproven technology, attempt a new
mission, and/or scale up (or down) the size of the craft used -- for
example, the C5A, the Trident Submarine, Space Telescope, and the
Stealth Bomber. The specific problems encountered on the GRO project
are typical:
o
o
o
o
manufacturing processes not well-understood
manufacturing problems due to materials faults/availabillty
lack of trained manufacturing work force
unexpected electromechanical interference between instruments,
once integrated
redesign of components and tooling
These problems led to a modest cost growth of $380 million to $500
million, and a schedule slip from May '88 to early 1990. Space Tele-
scope cost growth is $500 million to $1.4 billion. The average cost
growth observed in both NASA and DoD projects, from the start of Full-
Scale Development (FSD) to the completion of prototype production, has
been in the range 30-40%.
This type of track-record for Federal acquisition of large-scale
systems has led to Congressional skepticism, public outrage, and occa-
sionally loss of support for the continuation of the project. Since the
'60s, DoD and NASA project managers have sought management techniques
that will help them control cost growth and schedule slippages. Major
General John R. Guthrie, USA, stated at the 1970 DoD Project Managers
Conference that:
"the most rudimentary sort of good risk analysis might have enabled
us to avoid most of thepltfalls we have encountered. By rudimen-
tary I mean -- did we identify those items which were new and
identify the impact on overall system performance if that partic-
ular component or subsystem were to experience difficulty?"
Program risk analysis is an iterative process (Figure i) for
identifying, quantifying, and managing the uncertainties associated with
complex design and development programs typical to NASA. Others have
defined risk analysis as a systems analysis approach to risk, or as a
collection of techniques to identify, quantify, and manage risk. In
contrast to techniques for quantifying operational risk (e.g., failure
modes and effects analysis, fault tree analysis, reliability analysis),
111-1
Io
z_
<
O_w w<
_<_ _
_0_ _
|1|
IQ
o
0
,6.)
-,-i
g)
bO
b_
111-2
program risk analysis deals with program cost, schedule, and technical
performance estimates. The key question to be answered by risk analysis
is what are the distributions of probability on the mature (achieved)
values of each of these three random variables. In some risk analyses,
two of these variables (say, performance and schedule) are thought of as
fixed. Then the probability distribution on the mature value of the
other (cost) is derived. However, in a comprehensive risk analysis, the
dependence among these variables is assessed and uncertainty in one
affects the assessment of risk in the other two.
NASA NMI 7100.14A (Major System Acquisition) calls out risk eval-
uation as a criteria second only to performance for initiating FSD. MMI
7110.1 requires risk analysis and cost risk assessment for both formal
project pre-development reviews. Program risk ana]ysis is useful to
program managers as both a source of information on the program and as a
decision-aiding tool. The reason is that it is a formal, systematic,
and documented approach to dealing with uncertainty, versus "seat-of-the
pants" dealing with problems as they arise. It can be used in both
Phases A and B, as requirements and design configurations evolve, for
the purpose of early identification and resolution of technical uncer-
tainties. Classic risk resolution strategies are parallel development,
design/operations trade-offs, and development of back-up solutions. It
is probably of most use for assessing the potential for cost and sched-
ule slippages in programs moving into Phase C/D, because this is the
point at which significant resource commitments will be made. Risk
analysis can be applied to subsystems or instruments, individual tech-
nologies, manufacturing processes, and other elements that make up a
program; however, its true value is in synthesizing these multiple
uncertainties.
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OBJECTIVES
Each task team leader and project manager (PM) at NASA/MSFC should
become aware of the valuable information available from a program risk
analysis. The risk analysis process is iterative and risk analysis
should not be viewed as a one-time, check-the-box type activity. This
handbook is written with the view of the PM as the consumer for risk
analysis, and a range of options is provided so that the appropriate
type of analysis, at the right level of detail, may be requested.
This handbook is prepared as a guide and reference source for any
NASA employee who is requested to perform a risk analysis in support of
the PM. This individual will be referred to as "the risk analyst,"
although he/she may be a cost analyst, schedule analyst, program ana-
lyst, engineer, or scientist. An entire range of risk analysis tools
will be provided, along with some guidance for selecting the appropriate
technique for a given situation. However, it is always necessary that
the risk analyst apply his judgment when initiating a risk analysis at
the request of a PM. For example, he must decide what technique is
appropriate, given the time available and the software tools he has at
his disposal. Another key question is how much access to and coop-
eration from program personnel the analyst can expect; no meaningful
risk analysis can be generating without repeated, probing discussions
with practically all program personnel in order to identify technical
uncertainties and their potential cost and schedule impacts. Good
relations between risk analyst and technical team members is essential
if a valid, useful risk analysis is to be conducted. The only alterna-
tive, and one that works well, is for the risk analyst to be part of an
ad-hoc team of experts, independent of the project, whose job it is to
review the project and report to higher authority on its findings.
The selection and support of a risk analyst (or risk analysis
group) is an important step for large Industry/government design orga-
nizations and laboratories. The risk analyst is the alter-ego of top
management in his evaluation of a project, much as the quality assurance
analyst is for a production facility. He is often feared, avoided,
circumvented, and detoured. Other engineers generally view the risk
analyst as a nuisance who will take their valuable time, produce nothing
new, and perhaps misrepresent their professional judgment. Although it
is desirable for the risk analyst to be involved early in programs, and
have an established relationship with both PM and project personnel, the
fact is that risk analysis is usually a last-minute effort, performed on
an ad-hoc basis, prior to some major decislon/presentation. The risk
analyst is often not at all familiar with the technology or program
being analyzed. He must therefore:
I. Educate himself quickly.
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2. Acquire the data.
3. Use the data in somepre-developed model.
4. Present recommendationsbased on model output.
The above discussion clearly reveals that conducting a risk analy-
sis is not an easy job. The risk analyst must be an individual of
highest quality in education, technlcal/program experience, human
relations, and recognition of managementneeds. Manyof these positions
are filled by individuals with graduate-level training in statistics,
operations research, or systems analysis. An undergraduate degree in
engineering or hard sciences helps, but is not necessary. Individuals
who are enthralled with math models and/or computer techniques generally
aren't good risk analysts. The interaction with project personnel, the
collection and verification of data, and preparation of finding into a
format useful for managementare the key activities of the risk analyst.
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TERMINOLOGY
Several general references on program risk analysis are given in
the Bibliography. The definitions presented below are stated in broad
terms and would be accepted by anyone working in the program risk
analysis area. Of course, certain organizations and programs within
organizations adopt more specific definitions for terms such as "risk
area" -- in fact one of the first jobs for a risk analyst newly assigned
to a program is to work with the PM on an agreeable set of definitions
and working groundrules. Note also that more specialized terminology is
used in health and environmental risk analysis, and these terms are not
appropriate for program risk analysis.
Definitions
Risk -- the probability of undesirable future consequences of actions
(inaction) taken today. Thus risk has a temporal element, and is a
function of both probability and consequence.
Program risk -- the probability that the actual cost, time, or perfor-
mance of a system will fail to match predictions. Also, the degree by
which such predictions are missed and the associated consequences.
Potential problem -- an identified, but not yet occurring problem that
if actualized, will impose unplanned resource demands, rescheduling,
and/or degraded performance, quality, or safety margins.
Risk area -- a collection of related potential problems. Also a common
source of several potential problems.
Potential problem analysis (risk identification) -- identification of
risk areas and the sequence of interrelated potential problems that stem
from them. Also can include identification of immediate cost, schedule,
and performance impacts of potential problems, recognizing that poten-
tial problems may actualize at one of several levels of severity and
that there is a probability associated with each level.
Risk assessment -- using the information from risk identification, and
one or more quantitative techniques to synthesize the information, to
create an overall assessment of program cost, schedule, or technical
risk and also an assessment of the risk contributed by each risk area.
May include ranking risk areas by severity or timing in order to identi-
fy a course of action.
Risk management -- identifying alternatives, selecting an approach, and
taking action in order to reduce risk to levels deemed acceptable by the
organization. Action may be directed at risk reduction or in trading
one type of r_sk for another. In some instances, work around plans
111-6
and/or contingency budgets are defined as back-up solutions to the
selected risk reduction approach.
Probability -- the relative frequency of an outcome of a repeatable,
observable experiment. Also, a measurebetween 0 and i assigned to each
outcome of an experiment based on its relative frequency.
Subjective probability -- a measureof the lack of information an
organization or an individual has about the actual outcomeof some
future experiment. Essentially, it is a "degree of belief" measure
based on humanexperience and reasoning, as opposed to a "frequency of
occurrence" measure.
Probability encoding -- a process whereby the lack of information of an
expert is quantified as a subjective probability distribution on a state
variable, developed under specific assumptions, in a scientifically
correct way, with as muchaccuracy as is justifiable. Accuracy can be
increased by spending more time per encodedvariable, or by combining
the opinions of several experts.
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RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
A 95-page Program Ris k Analysis Handbook was prepared as the
primary product of this fellowship. This handbook will be published as
a NASA/MSFC Technical Memorandum (TM). The contents will be summarized
here.
All risk assessment techniques use subjective probability distri-
butions as input. The process of interviewing a technical expert and
determining the nature of the uncertainty in a variable of interest is
referred to as "probability encoding." We discuss this process and give
algorithms to encode the density function of five distribution types:
uniform, triangular, beta, Weibull, and normal.
Twelve distinct techniques for risk assessment were identified and
discussed. We grouped these techniques into three classes:
Quick Risk Assessment Techniques, which require i-2 days to
implement and use point probability estimates (risk factors)
as inputs. These methods require only a hand-held calculator,
and include:
- Equi-risk contours method
- Risk factor method (RFM)
- Probabilistic event analysis (PEA)
- Probabilistic Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT)
- Analytic Cost Risk Method
- Method of Moments
o Standard Risk Assessment Technique s, which require i-2 weeks
to implement and are based on Monte Carlo simulation. These
techniques require at least a microcomputer, and include:
- Simulation of the Critical path
- Simulation of the Project Network
- Simulation of the Cost Model
- Simulation of a Performance Model
o Integrated Risk Assessment Techniques, which require 1-2
months to implement and are performed using a network-based,
simulation package such as GERT, VERT, or RISNET. The tech-
niques are:
- Integrated Cost/Schedule Risk Assessment, based on direct
evaluation of cost and time uncertainty on each activity.
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- Integrated Technical/Cost/Schedule Risk Assessment, based on
simulation of the occurrence of technical problems and their
time/cost penalties.
Note that only in the integrated techniques are time and cost
treated dependently. A full discussion of each of these techniques and
related reference material maybe found in the Program Risk Analysis
Handbook. The techniques currently used at NASA/MSFCare indicated by
an asterisk in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2 Summary of Risk Assessment Method-
ology Alternatives
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on a thorough literature search, the range of quantitative
methods for program risk assessment have been presented. As shown in
Figure 2 twelve distinct alternatives were identified. These are
discussed in detail in the Program Risk Analysis Handbook, prepared as
the major product of this fellowship. All methods are based on the
Bayesian view of probability; they differ in how subjective probability
is collected (level of detail, assumptions, distribution types, etc.)
and how these probabilities are combined into an overall assessment of
uncertainty. Although "a risk assessment" can be done in a matter of
several days, the truly comprehensive risk methods treat technical,
cost, and schedule risks in an integrated (network-based) fashion and
require at least one month of up-front development. The management
benefits of integrated, network-based methods are worth the expense and
waitin$-time for the initial model output.
The recommendations for NASA/MSFC based on discussions with Program
Planning Office personnel and the contents of the handbook are:
la Commit to performing integrated cost/schedule risk assessment
on each program prior to releasing RFPs for the phase in
question. Quick risk assessments are, of course, appropriate
in certain circumstances.
. Require contractors to perform quantitative risk assessments
as part of their proposal preparation effort. Require that
these assessments be submitted as part of the technical volume
or as a separate volume, or back-up document. Be explicit
that meaningless LOW-MEDIUM-HIGH risk ratings are not accep-
table, and that integrated methods are preferred. Require
risk analysis be part of the systems analysis/management
process after contract award.
. Select (or hire) a full-time risk analyst to be stationed in
Program Planning with the following responsibilities:
o Perform risk analyses on all PD studies, with early involve-
ment with PM and study team.
o Write risk analysis requirements for all RFPs.
o Develop and document databases, questionnaires, and methods.
o Plan evolution of tools, either in-house development or
outside acquisition.
o Train project control personnel to perform risk analyses.
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o Interface with other centers.
o Consult with PMs, chief engineers on use of risk analysis on
their project.
Commit to investing the time and money to build a
state-of-the-art capability in program risk analysis at
NASA/MSFC.
o Give selected analyst one year to build background, learn to
use tools you have (ARTEMIS, SLAM, and SAM), and to review
available methods and computer packages.
o Consider purchase of network simulation package designed for
risk analysis.
- RISNET
- MICRO-VERT
Inform technical personnel in PD, and lab personnel supporting
PD, about what risk analysis_is and how they may be involved.
Perhaps include some training in basic statistical concepts
(classical and Bayesian) and generally encourage team-work,
cooperation in generation of risk information.
As experience is gained, consider expanding this handbook to
include:
- risk identification methods
- risk management methods
- lessons learned
- case histories
Consider expanding from one risk analyst to a risk and
decision analvsis group.
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